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Essay
Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of
Roe v. Wade
by
KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL*
Consider the following situation. It is the late 1960s and criminal
statutes prohibiting abortion are common throughout the country. A
lawyer wants to challenge the constitutionality of one such statute and
interviews a pregnant woman to be the plaintiff in the case. The lawyer is bright, idealistic, and committed to the cause of women's reproductive choice. Having had dn illegal abortion herself, she is working
without pay and determined to change the law limiting access to abortion. The would-be plaintiff is unsophisticated, nearly destitute, and
neither aware of nor committed to any cause. Having once before
given a child up for adoption, she is desperate to abort her current
pregnancy. Finding a plaintiff has not been easy, and the lawyer feels
this woman meets her criteria: she is pregnant, wants an abortion, and
is too poor to travel to a state where abortion is legal.
There is one complication: the young woman says she was raped.
This allegation confronts the lawyer with a strategic choice. The criminal statute in question has no rape exemption, so she could rely on
the rape allegation and argue that the statute is unconstitutional because of its failure to exempt rape victims. Or she could ignore the
rape allegation in favor of a broad challenge to the statute's general
prohibition of abortion.
Which strategy is the lawyer to choose? The narrower strategy
probably has a greater chance for success, at least in the abstract. Of
all aspects of the criminalization of abortion, banning abortion in rape
cases is perhaps the least popular and most difficult to defend. Thus,
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I am grateful to Rebecca
Dresser, Jonathan Entin, Peter Joy, Robert Lawry, Louise McKinney, Jennifer Russell,
Ann Southworth, and Robert Strassfeld for comments. I also thank Alice Hunt for her
invaluable secretarial support and Dorothy Gass for research assistance.
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it may be the statute's most vulnerable point. Higher likelihood of
success on the merits may also speed resolution of the case and increase the availability of injunctive relief in the trial court.1 Because
the prospective plaintiff is already pregnant, she must prevail and
probably also obtain injunctive relief in the trial court in a matter of
months to have any hope of aborting her pregnancy.
The lawyer, though, has concerns about the rape allegation. The
woman states that she failed to report the rape and there were no
corroborating witnesses. Weakness on the rape allegation might undermine the entire case. In addition, the broad strategy would advance the cause of reproductive choice more significantly than the
rape strategy, appealing to the lawyer's sense of responsibility to a
broad female constituency dedicated to expanding abortion rights and
to women in the future who will seek to abort pregnancies not resulting from rape.
May the lawyer agree to represent the woman but reject using the
rape allegation? If so, on what ground? Suspected falsity? Inadequate proof? Because it would be in the woman's best interest or because the broader challenge would better serve the abortion rights
cause?
These issues, raised in the first encounter between lawyer and client in the landmark abortion case Roe v. Wade,2 are typical of questions debated in a growing literature examining relations between
lawyers and clients in public interest practice. 3 In addition to such
1. Likelihood of success on the merits is one part of the standard used to grant a
preliminary injunction. 11A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3 (1995). The clarity of one's right to relief on the merits is also used in
determining the availability of a permanent injunction. Id. § 2942, at 43.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Examples include: JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982);
JERRY LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:
AN ETHICAL STUDY 294-391 (1988); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950, at 146-58 (1987); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J.
2107 (1991); Barbara Bedzek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor
Tenants' Voices in the Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Derrick A. Bell Jr.,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal
Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 119 (1977); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as

Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse,77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971 (1992); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed

Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power
and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982-1983); Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13
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normative questions, this literature also examines how public interest
lawyers and their clients actually do interact. Do public interest lawyers serve client interests or advance their own political and social
agendas? Do public interest lawyers empower or dominate their clients? Do they respect or silence client voices? Often these empirical
questions are hard to answer. Doctrines of privilege and confidentiality impede inquiry, and public records seldom reveal much about relations between lawyer and client. 4
We rarely have access to detailed accounts of public interest litigation from both the lawyer's and the client's perspectives. In Lucie
White's article telling the story of her interaction as a legal aid lawyer
with a client, for example, we hear the lawyer's version, but not the
client's.5 Two recent books on Roe v. Wade, however, give us both the
lawyer's and the client's stories of that case. Norma McCorvey, the
individual plaintiff fictitiously named "Jane Roe," writes from a client's perspective in I Am Roe.6 Sarah Weddington, the most celebrated of the Roe lawyers, provides a lawyer's account in A Question
of Choice.7 As the issues raised in their initial encounter may suggest,
these books are engaging and provocative resources for those interested in how public interest lawyers do treat, and should treat, their
clients.
Participant accounts such as these have their strengths and their
limitations. The accuracy of any witness's account of an event depends on the reliability of the witness's perceptions, memory, and narration of that event. Participation by McCorvey and Weddington in
many of the events they recount and the fact that the events were
important to each help enhance reliability. Participation provided
ARMz. L. REv. 805 (1971); Bill Ong Hing, Raising PersonalIdentification Issues of Class,
Race, Gender, Sexual Orientation,Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1807 (1993); Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decision Making in Civil
Rights and Poverty Practice: An EmpiricalStudy of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics (forthcoming June 1996); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79
YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); Lucie E. White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
4. TusHNET, supra note 3, at 200 n.35. As Professor Thshnet writes:
With a few exceptions.., most recent discussions of the ethics and politics of
public interest law have relied on anecdotes .... The reason is clear. Concern
about the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients has
made it difficult to obtain information about their relations. Public records such
as the transcripts of trials and hearings rarely disclose enough about the relevant
issues.
5. See White, supra note 3, at 21-32.
6. NORMA McCoRvEY, I AM ROE (1994).
7. SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE (1992).
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each author the opportunity to observe many of the things she writes
about, and the significance of the events in each author's life suggests
that her attention would have been well focused.
Other factors, though, weigh against accuracy. Participation and
significance, as potential sources of stress, may distort perception and
memory. Memory fades with time, and these books were written
roughly two decades after the Roe litigation. In the intervening years,
much has been written about the highly publicized and controversial
Roe decision, creating opportunities for memory distortion as multiple
reconstructions of past events shape and blend with one another.
Also, the motives of a witness may prompt conscious and unconscious
selection and addition of facts. Among the objectives that might distort McCorvey's and Weddington's accounts are possible desires to
influence current abortion politics, to defend past conduct, or simply
to tell a better story. 8 McCorvey's book was written with a coauthor,
another possible source of distortion. Accordingly, these books may
be viewed with some measure of skepticism as historically precise reconstructions of the Roe litigation.
Nonetheless, these books merit our attention. Though perhaps
imperfect witnesses, the lawyer and the client are often the only witnesses to what transpires between them. Regardless of flaws in historical accuracy, how each author talks about the case, about herself, and
about others involved in the case teaches us something about Weddington as lawyer and McCorvey as client. Weddington's account in
particular reveals the attitudes and assumptions of a prominent public

interest lawyer regarding legal ethics issues encountered in law reform
litigation.

These books have three facets. Each is part autobiography, part
commentary on the abortion issue, and part a story of Roe v. Wade.
The autobiographical portions provide context for understanding and
evaluating each woman's role in the case and their interaction. They
serve as a useful preface to discussion of the issues raised by the narratives of Roe.
8. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 204:
[Thurgood] Marshall is a great raconteur, and his reconstructions of what happened thirty or forty years before must be accepted with a skepticism born of the
knowledge that he is at least as much concerned with telling a good story as with
telling the true one. Sometimes, of course, the true story is a good story, too.
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A.

Sarah Weddington

As Sarah Weddington tells her life story, several themes recur.
Perhaps the most prominent is a deep identification with and commitment to women's rights and, in particular, the cause of reproductive
choice. She describes her victory in Roe, for example, as "an integral
part of my values and my self-concept." 9 A second theme is Weddington's image of herself as a pathbreaking representative for a broad
female constituency. She refers to her years in elected and appointed
office as ones spent "winning legislative and administrative battles for
women."' 1 In preparing to argue before the Supreme Court, she
speaks of owing "my best effort to the women who would continue to
be forced to seek illegal abortions if we lost"'1 and of her allotted time
for argument as "[t]hirty minutes to make them hear the voices of
women who had been through illegal or legal abortions.' 2 Weddington's subordination of her own interests to the interests of the cause of
reproductive choice provides a third recurring theme. She tells of
turning down a job with the American Bar Association in 1969 "with a
heavy heart" to spend "the Christmas holidays in the library researching for Roe.' 3 After leaving a prominent position in the Carter
White House, she recounts that no law firms offered her a job for fear
that her "ongoing involvement in the abortion issue would cause them
to lose clients."'1 4 The failure of her marriage, not having remarried,
and not having had children are also mentioned by Weddington as
5
costs of her involvement in the abortion rights cause.'
Weddington tells of chafing at an early age under sexist restrictions on women, deciding on law school when a college dean told her
it would be "too strenuous." In the summer of 1965, she entered the
University of Texas law school, one of five women in a class with 120
men. In 1967, Weddington encountered first-hand the constraints of
the same Texas abortion statute she would argue to overturn a few
years later in Roe. Unmarried and in her third year of law school, she
unexpectedly became pregnant and decided on an abortion. The restrictions of the Texas criminal ban, allowing abortions only "by medi9.

WEDDINGTON,

10. Id. at 236.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 262.
Id.

15. Id. at 187, 263.

supra note 7, at 198-99.
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cal advice for the purpose of saving the mother,"' 16 led Weddington to
a back alley abortion clinic in a Mexican border town where she paid
$400 in cash to an unknown doctor. Weddington describes in detail
her desperation and fear, the memories of which proved lasting. She
begins her book with the story of her abortion, describing it as one of
17
"three scenes" that "summarize my life.'
Weddington describes becoming active during law school in a
"women's liberation consciousness raising group" in Austin. 18 In
these passages, Weddington's image of herself as a representative for
the collective interests of women emerges. She describes sharing with
the women in her group "a dedication to the protection of women and
a goal of righting the wrongs we perceived."' 19 Members of the group
started an abortion referral service, providing counseling and information on safe, and sometimes illegal, abortions both in and out of Texas.
Weddington assisted the abortion referral project with fundraising and
legal research into possible criminal liability for providing abortion
referrals. Her research on criminal liability led her to the constitutional cases which provided the raw material for the arguments in
Roe.
As Weddington tells the story, the Roe case "really started be-

cause of... the abortion referral project volunteers. 20o These women
came up with the idea for the suit and, despite the fact that Weddington "had never been involved in a contested case,"'a recruited Weddington to handle the case. This fact later proves significant when
Weddington consistently views Roe as a case brought on behalf of women such as the abortion project volunteers rather than on behalf of
McCorvey. To Weddington, her work on Roe is simply one facet of a
collective effort to expand women's reproductive rights. She has a
deep sense of shared commitment to the abortion rights cause and
responsibility to a broad female constituency.
Despite her rank in the top quarter of her law school class, Weddington had difficulty finding employment in a male-dominated legal
profession. Months of job interviews produced no offers. Weddington finally got her first job as a practicing lawyer as an assistant city
16. The Texas abortion provisions in force at the time were found in Articles 11911194, 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. Their text is set forth in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
117-18 n.1 (1973).
17. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 11-15.
18. Id. at 35.
19. Id. at 36.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 45.
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attorney in Fort Worth Texas, the first female lawyer hired by that
office. Once it was clear the Supreme Court would review her trial
court victory in Roe, her boss handed her a note: "No more women's
lib. No more abortion. '22 Despite the difficulty she encountered finding a job, when forced to choose between that job and the Roe case,
Weddington, seemingly without hesitation, chose the case. In Weddington's view, the good of the cause trumps individual self-interest.
While Roe was still under submission with the Supreme Court,
Weddington was elected to the Texas House of Representatives, the
first woman to represent her county and one of only five women in the
150-member Texas House. Weddington describes the decision to run
as an exercise in collective female political action. Weddington and
four female friends with shared political goals felt that women needed
"more champions" in the legislature. Together they decided that
Weddington should run. She saw in her election the chance to carry
'23
on the battle to "free women from the horrors of illegal abortion.
She describes her determination, once elected, to do "an extraordinarily fine job" because her "presence there [was] an opportunity to
open the door for many other women." 24 Her agenda throughout her
five years in the Texas legislature was filled with women's issues: an
equal credit bill, employment protection for pregnant teachers, rape
law reform, and work on both the Texas and national Equal Rights
amendments.
Roe brought Weddington national prominence. In 1975, she became president of the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws and testified in that capacity before Congress. In 1977,
Weddington received a federal appointment with the Carter administration as general counsel to the United States Department of Agriculture. She resigned her seat in the Texas House to seek "the bigger
levers of power in Washington" which she thought "could be used to
advance the position of women. '25 Soon after her arrival in Washington, she was appointed an assistant to President Carter, responsible
for finding women qualified for various federal positions and generally "the point person for any issue of special interest to women. ' 26
The later chapters of Weddington's book focus on recent abortion
politics and are explicitly aimed at rallying interest in and commit22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at

83.
144.
145.
187.
194.
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ment to the abortion rights cause. Weddington's autobiography becomes sketchy after her years in the Carter Administration, but
Weddington's continued national prominence as a spokesperson for
the pro-choice viewpoint is clear. In 1989, for example, when the
Supreme Court revisited abortion in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,27 Weddington spoke at NOW's national demonstration in
support of abortion rights and provided nationally broadcast commentary for ABC television. 28 In 1991, she testified against the confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas on abortion rights
29
grounds.
B. Norma McCorvey
The life story Norma McCorvey recounts also has its recurring
themes. The most prominent is McCorvey's search for identity and
her transformation from accidental symbol to spokesperson for abortion rights. McCorvey's description of herself prior to and during the
Roe litigation, for example, reveals no allegiance on her part to any
political or social cause. By 1994, though, McCorvey was giving prochoice speeches and writing that "the cause of reproductive freedom
has become a part of me."' 30 A second theme is McCorvey's view of
herself as powerless and voiceless, someone whose life is shaped by
others with power and authority to act and speak. Whether it is the
judge who sends her to reform school or the mother who tricks her
into relinquishing custody of her first child, someone other than McCorvey regularly seems to be calling the shots in her life.
Born in rural Louisiana in a house with an outdoor privy, McCorvey describes her childhood with details such as drinking coffee and
beer at age seven, having a grandmother who was the madam of a
brothel, and being physically beaten by her mother. She was a "tough
girl" who "ditched" school, shoplifted, and hung out at a local bowling
alley where men shared beer with her. McCorvey had her first encounter with the legal system at age ten. She stole money from a local
service station and ran away from home, only to be returned handcuffed in the back of a police car. After a Catholic boarding school
expelled her as a "bad influence," McCorvey spent the years from age
eleven to fifteen at a Texas state reform school. She describes these
27.

492 U.S. 490 (1989).

28.

WEDDINGTON,

supra note 7, at 215-16, 222-23.

29. Id. at 229.
30. McCoRvEY, supra note 6, at 5.
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years as "the happiest of my childhood. '31 Her home situation was
such that she ran away twice in order to be sent back to reform school.
Schooling ended and work began for McCorvey at age fifteen
with a job as a roller-skating carhop at a drive-in restaurant. A customer with a pompadour and a shiny '57 Ford Fairlane became her
first boyfriend and, as soon as she turned sixteen, her husband. Not
far into the marriage, McCorvey began to experience physical symptoms her landlady explained might mean she was pregnant. When
McCorvey went to a local free clinic for a pregnancy test, she left without being tested rather than reveal her ignorance as to what a urine
sample was. Her husband beat her upon learning of the pregnancy
and she returned to her mother to have the baby.
McCorvey again encountered the legal system, though somewhat
indirectly, when she lost custody of her daughter to her mother. On
returning home, McCorvey discovered and began to frequent the lesbian and gay bar scene in Dallas. One morning after McCorvey had
confessed her lesbian sexual orientation to her mother and while McCorvey was still hung over from a night of heavy drinking, her mother
asked her to sign some "insurance papers" for her baby. The papers
turned out to be legal documents granting custody to her mother. For
years afterward, McCorvey saw the child only sporadically.
Despite being lesbian, McCorvey continued to have casual affairs
with men. One such week-long affair resulted in a second unplanned
pregnancy. McCorvey gave birth to the baby, never saw it, and gave it
up for adoption. In addition to drinking heavily, McCorvey began
both to use and sell drugs such as LSD and diet pills. She worked as a
bartender, a pool hustler, then as a barker "running the freak show"
in a traveling carnival. When the carnival closed for the season, McCorvey found herself in Florida, twenty-one years old, nearly destitute, and pregnant again. This third unplanned pregnancy led to the
Roe case.
McCorvey describes herself as a rough and unsophisticated woman who has lived much of her life "at the bottom edge of American
society"3 2 and who has "not been able to spend a lifetime thinking of
big issues or political strategies. '33 She has worked much of her life as
a cleaning woman gauging economic success by being able to buy
"new sneakers or do a whole week's worth of grocery shopping in one
31. Id. at 35.
32. Id.at 5.
33. Id. at 2.
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trip. '34 In the pages devoted to the years from 1969 until 1973, when
the Roe suit was pending, she clearly does not consider herself part of
involved in
the abortion rights movement. She describes becoming
'35
Roe because "I was simply at the end of my rope.
McCorvey tells of an awakening in herself in the 1980s of interest
in women's issues and the abortion rights cause. In describing herself
more than a decade after the Roe case was litigated, she says: "I knew
almost nothing about [Roe v. Wade] except what I had seen with my
own two eyes. For the first time, I was curious. I went to the library
and checked out some books on women's rights. '36 She describes
studying "more and more about the women's and pro-choice movements" and reading "the Roe decision .

side."'37

.

. with a dictionary along-

In 1984, fortified by vodka and valium, she publicly revealed
her role in Roe in a local television interview that brought her to the
attention of such well-known journalists as Carl Rowan and Fred
Friendly. In 1989, nearly twenty years after becoming the plaintiff in
Roe, McCorvey reached what she terms "a turning point. '38 "My
commitment to pro-choice began to surge," she writes, and "I finally
accepted myself as Jane Roe and stepped out of the political closet." 39
McCorvey's relationship with what she terms "the women's
movement" has been awkward and ambivalent. "[T]o some in the
women's movement," she states, "I am... a nuisance. An embarrassment. An accidental part of their lives."'40 McCorvey tells of volunteering at a women's health clinic providing abortion services near her
home in Texas until one day the clinic was visited by an unnamed
"major figure in the women's movement."'41 McCorvey describes the
encounter as follows:
She walked around the office, standing very tall and sure of herself,
shaking hands with everyone. "Hi, I'm Norma McCorvey," I said to
her. And then, for some reason-in order to make more contact
with her? or because she looked so cool and confident and together,
and I was so intimidated?-I blurted out, "I'm the Jane Roe of Roe
v. Wade." She looked at me, smiled, and shook her head. "No,
No," she said. "I know who Jane Roe is. She wouldn't be here
34.

Id. at 150.

35.

Id. at 115.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 180.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 157.
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doing this kind of work." She moved on. I put down my work,

went home and cried. I didn't go back.42
When McCorvey approached the stage at a pro-choice rally in the
early 1990s, at first she was not recognized and was told she "had no
business being there. '43 When she informed the organizers who she
was, McCorvey was given a VIP sash and a place on the speakers'
platform, but no one asked her to speak.
Symbolic of her newly discovered political consciousness and
conversion to the pro-choice cause is a move she describes making to
Northern California to live for a while near "a community consisting
mostly of feminists and lesbians and strongly pro-choice women." 44
She went to public speaking school and emerged a sort of self-appointed spokeswoman for abortion rights, appearing in places as varied as local women's clubs and the "Good Morning America"
television show. The pro-choice speech she delivered on these occasions, captioned "The Jane Roe Speech," appears at the end of her
book. In it she calls on others to "stand up and be counted" and support organizations such as Planned Parenthood and the National Organization for Women. The last lines of this speech and her book are:
"Silence no more! We will not go back!" 45
McCorvey, though, recently realigned herself on the abortion issue. This development provides a postscript to her book that is both
peculiar in light of its pro-choice political message but also fitting with
its themes of transformation and being subject to other people's
power. McCorvey in her book seems to view Operation Rescue, the
militant pro-life group, as the very antithesis of her political orientation. 46 Yet in August of 1995, little more than a year after the publication of her book, McCorvey was baptized by the national director of
Operation Rescue and quoted in the press as saying, "I'm pro-life. I
think I have always been pro-life, I just didn't know it." 47 In subsequent interviews, McCorvey clarified that she "hasn't changed sides
all the way" and still supports a woman's right to choose an abortion
in the first trimester of pregnancy.48
42. Id. at 158.
43.

Id.at 194.

44. Id. at 196.
45. Id. at 209.
46. See id. at 187 (McCorvey describes Operation Rescue as a group that is "run by a
small circle of men" whose strategies "stretch and break the limits of civil disobedience.").
47. "Jane Roe" Joins Anti-Abortion Group, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 11, 1995, at A12.
48. Steven Waldman & Ginny Carroll, Roe v. Roe, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1995, at 22.
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Sarah Weddington responded to the news of McCorvey's conversion by discounting McCorvey's significance. Weddington is quoted
as saying, "All Jane Roe did was sign a one page affidavit. She was
pregnant and didn't want to be. That was her total involvement in the
case."

49

II
As the autobiographical portions of their books indicate, Weddington and McCorvey brought to the Roe case some common experiences and interests. Each knew first-hand what it was like to
experience an unplanned pregnancy and to be desperate for an abortion but unable to obtain one because of the Texas criminal ban on
abortion. Weddington and McCorvey each had an interest in having
the Texas abortion statute abrogated and each needed the other to
accomplish this end. Unlike some lawyers and clients in public interest practice, no barriers of sex or race divided them.
But their experiences and interests also diverged significantly.
Weddington was well educated, politically aware and committed,
while McCorvey was poorly educated, and neither politically aware
nor committed. Weddington was interested in making history, changing the law to "somehow, someday ... free women from the horrors

of illegal abortion. '50 McCorvey, by contrast, was simply "at the end
of [her] rope," 51 interested in terminating the pregnancy that was the
source of her current dilemma. In more abstract terms, their relationship reflected a tension between McCorvey's present individual interest in obtaining an abortion and the future collective interests of other
women in greater access to abortion. In a legal system in which individual cases both resolve present disputes and generate future legal
norms, any case may be subject to such a tension between the present
individual interests of parties affected by the case as a dispute resolution mechanism and the future collective interests of those affected by
the case as a precedent. In Roe, this tension was particularly acute.
McCorvey was desperate and had no one other than her lawyer to
look out for her interests. At the same time, the case also held the
potential to dramatically advance the emotionally charged collective

49.

Id.

50.
51.

WEDDINGTON,

supra note 7, at 144.
MCCORVEY, supra note 6, at 115.
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interests animating the abortion rights cause, to undo in one bold
stroke a century of restrictive abortion legislation.52
How, then, did this mix of similar and dissimilar interests play
itself out in the Roe case? A good starting point for answering this
question is Weddington's handling of McCorvey's rape allegation.
A.

The Rape Allegation

As the introductory paragraphs of this essay indicate, McCorvey
in her first meeting with Weddington claimed that her pregnancy resulted from rape. More than ten years later, McCorvey would admit
in an interview with Carl Rowan that this claim was false.53 But in
1970 and for years thereafter, McCorvey maintained that she had
been raped. A detailed version of McCorvey's rape story was even
published in a magazine a few months after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Roe.54 Weddington chose not to use the allegation. Her description of and justification for this decision tell a
great deal about her attitude toward and treatment of McCorvey.
When Weddington met McCorvey in 1970, abortion rights activists in the United States were pursuing two distinct strategies in attacking the criminal prohibition of abortion. The nature of each is
critical to appreciating Weddington's response to McCorvey's rape
claim. A reform strategy sought to liberalize the law of abortion by
decriminalizing certain categories of abortion, such as those of
pregnancies resulting from rape or incest, but otherwise left the criminal ban on abortion intact. An abolitionstrategy sought complete repeal of criminal abortion laws, including liberalized statutes such as
those advocated by the reform strategy.55 Exemplified by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code abortion provision, the reform
strategy had succeeded in a number of states and was gaining momentum at the time Weddington met McCorvey in early 1970. By 1970,
states such as Colorado, North Carolina, California, Georgia, Oregon,
52. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Conflict over ConstitutionalLegitimacy, in THE
AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 16 (1983) ("Thus in one bold, cataclysmic move the Court [in Roe v. Wade] undid about a century of legislative action. It swept
away every abortion law in the country, just as in the first death penalty case the Court
undid all capital punishment laws and emptied every death house in the land.").
53. Id. at 179-80.
54. See Joseph N. Bell, A Landmark Decision, GooD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1973, at
77.
55. These strategies are described in detail in DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THm RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 270-388 (1994).
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New Mexico, and Delaware had adopted reform statutes,5 6 though reform efforts had failed elsewhere. Weddington and her colleagues, for
example, supported an unsuccessful reform bill brought before the
Texas legislature in 1969. By 1973, when Roe was decided, about onethird of the states had adopted reform statutes.57 The abolition strategy, by contrast, supported by groups such as the National Organization for Women, had met with little success in state legislatures in the
late 1960s. 5 8 In 1973, the abolitionist strategy ultimately prevailed in
Roe, which invalidated restrictive abortion statutes, and in its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 59 which invalidated liberalized abortion
statutes.
McCorvey's rape claim, then, had strategic significance because it
raised the possibility for Weddington of choosing either a reform or an
abolition strategy in pursuing Roe. Weddington was clearly cognizant
of both strategies. In 1970, both reform and abolition strategies were
being actively pursued by abortion reformers around the United
States. Indeed, Weddington describes herself as "moderating

. ..

a

conflict among pro-choice forces" in Texas in 1970 about whether to
back reform or abolition legislation, describing the dispute between
reform and abolition strategies as a "conflict between what was possi''60
ble and what was ideal.
How should Weddington have handled this choice? Was she required to reject the rape allegation because of suspected falsity? If
Weddington had known McCorvey was lying, she would have been
required to reject the allegation.61 Because she did not know McCorvey was lying, she was not barred on that ground from using the allegation. Was she required to reject the rape allegation for lack of
corroborating witnesses? If Weddington had been a prosecutor pursuing a criminal rape charge, Texas law at the time would have barred
her from using McCorvey's uncorroborated rape allegation. 62 But
Weddington was a private lawyer filing a civil case, so the Texas rape
corroboration requirement did not apply. So neither suspected falsity
56. Id.
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973).
58. See GARROW, supra note 55, at 335-88.
59. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
60. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 75.
61. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1981) ("In
his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not.., knowingly use perjured testimony or
false evidence.") (emphasis added); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.3(a)(4) (1994) ("a lawyer shall not knowingly.., offer evidence that the lawyer knows to
be false.") (emphasis added).
62. See infra note 75.
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nor lack of corroboration required Weddington to reject McCorvey's
rape claim.
What decision was best for McCorvey? A reform strategy relying
on the rape allegation probably had the better chance of success, as
Weddington's own description of reform legislation as representing
the "possible" and abolition the "ideal" suggests. Of all aspects of the
criminalization of abortion, banning abortions in rape cases is perhaps
the least popular and most difficult to defend; thus the Texas criminal
abortion statute's lack of a rape exemption may have been the statute's most vulnerable point. A reform strategy might also have been
more likely to succeed since it would have sought from the federal
trial court a more modest exercise of judicial power and less severe
infringement on state authority than the abolition strategy by seeking
to overturn only part of the Texas statute. In addition, the reform
strategy's objective-decriminalization of abortion in rape cases-was
apparently more politically palatable than that of the abolition strategy, because it had already been legislatively adopted in a number of
states. Conversely, the abolition of criminal abortion laws in their entirety had met with much less political success in state legislatures.
Higher likelihood of success on the merits would have increased the
chances of a speedier resolution and obtaining injunctive relief,63 both
significant for McCorvey's chances for obtaining an abortion since she
was already pregnant.
But there were also significant risks associated with use of the
rape allegation. If proof of the rape allegation was weak and its truth
suspect, it might provide the opposing side a point of vulnerability for
attacking and undermining the plaintiff's entire case. In other words,
lack of credibility on that one issue might result in loss of credibility
and sympathy on other factual and legal issues. It also might raise a
contested factual issue which could delay resolution of the case and
thus decrease McCorvey's chances for obtaining an abortion.
What decision on the rape allegation was best for the abortion
rights cause? This is not an easy question to answer. The advantages
and disadvantages of both the reform and abolition strategies were
widely debated at the time by abortion reformers. Some favored an
incremental approach of attempting to liberalize abortions laws, while
others favored the more ambitious strategy of seeking complete abolition. The suspected falsity of the rape claim weighed against its use.

63. See WRIGHT

ET AL.,

supra note 1, § 2948.3.
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If it was later exposed as false, it could cause a public relations
nightmare for the abortion rights cause.
Weddington and her cocounsel Linda Coffee, who was present at
Weddington's first meeting with McCorvey, opted not to rely on McCorvey's rape claim. They chose instead an abolition strategy. Weddington offers the following justification for the decision not to rely on
the rape claim:
As the conversation continued, Jane Roe asked if it would help

if she had been raped. We said no; the Texas law had no exception
for rape. It was just as illegal for a doctor to do an abortion for
someone who had been raped as it was in any other situation. I did
ask, "Were there any witnesses? Was there a police report? Is
there any way that we could prove a rape occurred?" Her answer in
each instance was no.
Neither Linda nor I questioned her further about how she had
gotten pregnant. I was not going to allege something in the complaint that I could not back up with proof. Also, we did not want
the Texas law changed only to allow abortion in cases of rape. We
wanted a decision that abortion was covered by the right of privacy.
After all, the women coming to the referral project were there as a
result of a wide variety of circumstances. Our principles were not
based on how conception occurred. 64
Though rejection of McCorvey's rape claim may well have been
appropriate, this justification is problematic for several reasons. Weddington fails to confront directly the strategic significance of the decision being made or even to mention the possibility of a reform
strategy. Nor does she mention the interests of her client, McCorvey,
or how Weddington's decision about the rape allegation and choice of
strategy might affect her client's interests. In a concurring opinion in
Roe, Chief Justice Burger noted that "[i]n oral argument, counsel for
the State of Texas informed the Court that early abortion procedures
were routinely permitted in certain exceptional cases, such as nonconsensual pregnancies resulting from rape and incest. '65 If such a
prosecutorial policy of allowing abortions in rape and incest cases existed, McCorvey's rape allegation might have gained her access to an
abortion. Weddington quotes this very passage from the Burger opinion in her book more than a hundred pages after the passage in which
she describes her response to McCorvey's rape allegation. 66 But she
never connects the two. She does not mention the possibility of such a
WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 52-53.
65. 410 U.S. at 208.

64.
66.

WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 163.
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policy in assessing the significance of McCorvey's rape allegation, and
she fails to explore whether such a policy actually existed.
What Weddington does offer in support of her decision not to use
the rape allegation is a justification based on three rationales: irrelevance, lack of proof, and "our principles."
(1)

Irrelevance

Weddington tells us that McCorvey asked "if it would help if she
had been raped." In an earlier published speech, she describes McCorvey as asking "whether her case would be stronger if she had been
raped." 67 Weddington describes herself as answering "no; the Texas
law had no exception for rape. ' 68 Weddington's reasoning here seems
to be that since the Texas abortion statute had no exception for rape,
rape as the source of the pregnancy would not help or strengthen McCorvey's case. In other words, the rape allegation was simply
irrelevant.
Is this an adequate assessment of the potential relevance of rape
to McCorvey's legal situation? Certainly Weddington's description of
the Texas statute as lacking a rape exemption is accurate. Her relevance assessment would also be correct if McCorvey had been
charged with a criminal violation of the Texas statute. To be relevant,
evidence must prove a fact which is "of consequence to the determination of the action. '69 Since the Texas statute did not exempt cases of
rape, rape would not be a fact "of consequence to the determination"
of a criminal abortion case under that statute and evidence offered to
prove rape would thus be irrelevant.
But of course McCorvey had not been charged with a criminal
violation of the Texas abortion statute, nor apparently could she have
been. As Weddington later advised the Supreme Court in her oral
argument, under Texas law a woman receiving an illegal abortion "is
guilty of no crime whatsoever. '70 Rather, Weddington and McCorvey
67. Sarah Weddington, Roe v. Wade: Pastand Future, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 601,603
(1990) (emphasis added).

68.

WEDDINGTON,

supra note 7, at 52.

69. FED. R. Evm. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequenceto the determinationof the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.") (emphasis added).
70. 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: ROE v. WADE

(Roy M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman eds., 1993) (citing

transcript of oral argument before the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, December 13, 1971).
MRs. WEDDINGTON:

.... The woman is guilty of no crime, even though she

seeks out the doctor, even though she consents, even though she participates,
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were discussing a civil challenge to the Texas abortion statute. In such
a case, the relevance of rape depended on the strategy chosen by the
lawyers. Under an abolition strategy, rape would be irrelevant since
the entire statute, rather than just its application to rape victims,
would be challenged. Under a reform strategy, rape would have been
relevant since it would have been critical to McCorvey's standing to
challenge the statute's application to rape victims. The Texas abortion
statute's lack of a rape exemption, the very feature emphasized by
Weddington in explaining that the rape allegation was irrelevant, was
precisely what would have made rape relevant if Weddington had chosen a reform strategy.
Ultimately, then, it was Weddington's choice not to pursue a reform strategy rather than the language of the Texas statute that rendered McCorvey's rape allegation irrelevant. Weddington's
justification obscures this point with its suggestion that the terms of
the Texas statute rather than the lawyer's choice of strategy dictated
exclusion of the rape allegation from the Roe complaint. Here a
facade of apparent legal inevitability masks Weddington's exercise of
power and disregard of McCorvey's interests and insulates them from
scrutiny or challenge.
(2) Lack of Proof

Weddington also justifies her rejection of the rape claim by telling
us she lacked proof of the rape. She asks McCorvey about witnesses,
a police report, or "any way that we could prove" the rape. 71 When
McCorvey answers no, Weddington, without asking her any further
questions, concludes that she "was not going to allege something in
the complaint that I could not back up with proof. ' 72 What Weddington appears here to disregard entirely is the possibility of McCorvey
herself testifying about the alleged rape. Using McCorvey's own
even though she pays for the procedure; she again is guilty of no crime
whatsoever."
Id. at 462.
QUESTION: Could they, under Texas law, be charged as accomplicesMRS. WEDDINGTON: No, Your Honor.
QUESTION: -or as co-conspirators or anything like that?
MRS. WEDDINGTON: No. We have express Texas cases. In one situation, Wood-

row v. State, an 1880 case, the woman had taken a potion to induce abortion, and
the Texas court specifically said that the woman is guilty of no crime, even in that
situation; and that in fact she is the victim of our law.
Id. at 456.
71. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 52.

72.

Id. at 52-53.

March 1996]

TWO TALES OF ROE v. WADE

words as proof is neither mentioned nor evaluated. In fact, Weddington's description suggests that, rather than probing McCorvey's story,
she made a conscious choice to avoid learning whatever details McCorvey might have been willing to provide. Her failure to make a
detailed inquiry into McCorvey's rape allegation is confirmed later in
the book, when Weddington tells us she "was startled by many of the
details" of McCorvey's rape allegation when she read about them
three years later in a magazine. 73
Uncorroborated words from McCorvey do not seem to count as
proof in Weddington's eyes, whose choice not to probe the details of
the rape allegation treats McCorvey's voice as either unreliable or unimportant. Weddington's emphasis on corroboration along with her
failure to ask McCorvey for the details of her uncorroborated rape
story also resonate uncomfortably with the sexist attitudes found in
rape law's corroboration doctrine, under which the uncorroborated
testimony of an alleged rape victim was treated as inadequate proof in
a criminal rape case. 74
Perhaps Weddington's concern with corroboration and her apparent disregard of McCorvey's possible testimony reflects her anticipation that McCorvey's rape claim would later be subjected to the
corroboration doctrine then in existence in Texas. When Weddington
interviewed McCorvey in 1970, Texas law did require corroboration of
a rape charge in which the alleged victim failed promptly to make a
report.75 But Weddington was contemplating filing a civil case in
which rape might have been alleged, not a criminal rape prosecution.
The criminal law's corroboration requirement would not have applied
to McCQrvey's case, though Weddington may have mistakenly analogized to the proof requirements in a criminal rape prosecution.
Perhaps Weddington was concerned with how McCorvey would
fare as an uncorroborated witness testifying and being cross-examined
in what was likely to be a high-profile, controversial trial. She could
reasonably anticipate both resistance from the lawyers representing
73. Id. at 256.
74. The corroboration doctrine is discussed in SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 42-47

(1987); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 369-72 (6th ed. 1995); White, supra note 3, at 19 n.74; Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement"Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).

75. See Thomas v. State, 476 S.W.2d 305,307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ("Corroboration
is ordinarily required in those forcible rape cases where a belated outcry was made.") (citation omitted); Hughes v. State, 124 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939) ("In this case
the prosecutrix makes a complete case. But having failed to make any complaint until four
or five days after the occurrence, the case falls within the rule requiring corroboration of
her testimony in order to sustain a conviction.") (citations omitted).
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the state and scrutiny by anti-abortion groups. But this explanation
fails to explain why Weddington would cease inquiry into McCorvey's
story upon learning that corroboration was lacking. If anything, lack
of corroboration would make it more important to hear McCorvey's
story in detail to evaluate her as a potential witness. Ironically, McCorvey was never required either to testify or to be cross-examined.
In the trial court, Roe was resolved through summary judgment 76 with
77
Weddington simply submitting McCorvey's affidavit.
As with her irrelevance justification, the inadequate proof justification offered by Weddington fails satisfactorily to explain rejection of
the rape claim and again masks the lawyer's exercise of power and
disregard of client interests by making the lawyer's decision appear as
if it had been dictated by the law.
"Ourprinciples"

(3)

The third justification offered by Weddington for rejecting the
rape allegation is that "we did not want the Texas law changed only to
allow abortion in cases of rape.... Our principles were not based on
how conception occurred."7 8 This justification raises several
problems. First, to whom is Weddington referring when she uses the
words "we" and "our"? She might simply mean the lawyers, herself
and Linda Coffee. Or she might be referring to the lawyers' broader
constituency, supporters of the abortion rights cause, such as the abortion referral project volunteers who first suggested bringing a test case
to challenge the Texas abortion statute. In either case, the assumption
underlying this reference to the desires and principles of the lawyers
or their constituency as a justification for rejection of the rape allegation is at odds with basic conflict of interest norms governing lawyers.
Neither the interests of the lawyer nor the interests of third parties are
permitted to influence the judgment of a lawyer in representing a client.79 Rather, only the interests of the client are to guide the lawyer.80
76. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 53.
78.
79.

Id.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 5-1 (1981) ("The profes-

sional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for
the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his
personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.") (footnote omitted).
80. Id.
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As noted above, Weddington does not mention McCorvey's interests
in describing her decision about the rape claim.8 '
McCorvey seems oblivious in her book to the strategic implications of the rape allegation and how its use might have affected her
interests in the Roe case. She also seems to have been ignorant for
years of Weddington's decision not to use the rape allegation. Rather,
McCorvey appears to have believed until relatively recently that Weddington had used the rape allegation. For instance, McCorvey writes
as follows about the day after she learned of the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe:
Over the living room table I told Connie everything. I told her
how I became Jane Roe. I told her about my anger and frustration
over the case. About my strained relationship with Sarah Weddington and about my biggest fear-thatmy lie about being raped would
somehow be found out and both Jane Roe and I would be exposed as
liars.
I told Connie that I was proud of being Jane Roe, even though
being found out scared me, now more than ever. Would I go to jail?
Would the whole case then be overturned? Would abortion then be
illegal again, and would millions of women in America go back to
suffering and helplessness? 82
Similarly, she writes of the time immediately following her revelation
to Carl Rowan that her rape story was a lie:
The next day, there was an article on the front page of the
Morning News. The headline was: "Roe v. Wade Plaintiff Says She
Lied About Rape." I braced myself for the worst. But amazingly,
there was very little about the possibility of the decision being overturned. . . . Sarah issued a statement calling my rape lie
"irrelevant."
In the next few days I got lots of calls from reporters about the
issue. They all seemed to understand why I lied. Some even understood how and why I'd agonized about it. There were a few more
articles published. And then, silence.
The cloud of gray that had been such
a big part of my life tore
83
itself into little pieces and went away.
As these passages suggest, McCorvey appears not to have been
informed by Weddington about her decision not to use the rape allegation and consequently agonized for years over her false claim of
rape. It seems, though, that whatever might have been in McCorvey's
best interest at the time the case was ified, McCorvey, in retrospect,
seems relieved that the rape allegation was never used.
81.

WEDDINGTON,

supra note 7, at 52-53.

82. McCoRvEY, supra note 6, at 155 (emphasis added).

83. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
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Who was Jane Roe?

Another issue that arose early in the Roe case was the use of the
fictitious name "Jane Roe" for McCorvey. As with the decision about
use of the rape allegation, how Weddington writes about the name
Jane Roe illuminates her attitudes toward both the case and
McCorvey.
Taken literally, the question "Who was Jane Roe?" has a simple,
uncontroversial answer on which both Weddington and McCorvey
agree. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly allow
parties to proceed anonymously, but courts generally allow a plaintiff
to use a fictitious name when a case raises highly sensitive, personal
84
issues and the plaintiff desires to engage in prohibited conduct.
These conditions were clearly met in Roe, so the use of a pseudonym
for McCorvey was appropriate and not the source of any conflict between Weddington and McCorvey. On a literal level, Jane Roe was
simply a pseudonym for Norma McCorvey.
On a figurative level, though, asking "Who was Jane Roe?" is a
way of asking whose interests were actually being served on the plaintiff's side of the case. Symbolically, to Weddington, Jane Roe was not
Norma McCorvey. Rather, the name Jane Roe "represented all women, not just one."'8 5 In other words, Jane Roe was a fictional personification of the collective needs and interests of women.
McCorvey refers to Jane Roe throughout her book as if she were
a third person-a fictional, politically aware woman committed to
pro-choice values. After McCorvey publicly revealed her identity as
the plaintiff in Roe, someone fired a shotgun into the front door of her
home. She writes as follows about her reaction to that incident.
They never found the person-or people-who shot into our
home. But I think it's safe to assume that the woman they were
trying to scare or hurt or kill wasn't Norma McCorvey, a poor uneducated Texas building manager.
The woman they were aiming at was Jane Roe. She was the
person whose name stood for change and women's rights. The woman who threatened all their old attitudes and prejudices.
But here is the miraculous part about that awful night: Jane
Roe stood up for both of us.... It was Jane Roe who finally found
84. Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599
F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1979); see generally Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous
Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 1 (1985).
85. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 54.
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me some answers and some peace. I hadn't known
that she-we86
were capable of that. It was a turning point.
McCorvey uses this literary device to describe her transformation
from political agnostic to committed spokesperson for abortion rights.
During the course of her book, McCorvey tells of "becoming Jane
Roe" more than a decade after Roe was decided by the Supreme
Court.87 In McCorvey's tale, she is transformed well after the Roe
case was decided into the person Weddington acted as if she represented all along. On a symbolic level, then, both Weddington and McCorvey seem to agree that while the Roe case was pending, Jane Roe
was not McCorvey, but rather a symbolic personification of the values
and interests which animated the abortion rights movement.
C. Two Tales of Roe v. Wade

These books both use much of the same material in constructing
their stories: the details of the Roe litigation, the women's movement
for reproductive freedom, and the personal biographies of Weddington and McCorvey. But, as the passages above suggest, the perspectives each brings to bear on these materials are strikingly different.
For Weddington, the story of Roe v. Wade is first and foremost a
story of law reform in the service of the collective interests of women.
In this story, the idea of service to an individual client has no particular significance. Weddington at the end of her book, for example,
states that "the story of Roe ... is the story of the women of this

country and their continuing efforts to push back the barriers that
have limited their decisions and circumscribed their freedoms ....
,,88
Significantly, McCorvey as an individual is not mentioned. Rather,
the protagonists of Weddington's story are women as a group, and the
story's drama arises from the conflict between two large interest
groups-the abortion rights cause and the anti-abortion movement.
One might view Weddington's broad perspective and collective
focus as resulting from the fact that she is a lawyer retrospectively
assessing, from a distance of twenty years, one of the most controversial cases of this century. Thus she would naturally be drawn to the
impact of the case on the larger interests of society. But the way Weddington tells her story suggests that there is more behind her collective
focus. Her routine use of collective interests in describing and justifying her decisions throughout the litigation suggests a view of the ci86.

MCCoRvEY, supra note 6, at 191.

87. Id. at 195.
88.

WEDDINGTON,

supra note 7, at 290.
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ent's role in reform litigation that is at odds with the "fundamental
premise of American adjudicative structures... that clients, not their
counsel, define litigation objectives." 89 Weddington's book takes as
its premise that the lawyer, rather than the client, defines the litigation's objectives. The client, in turn, is marginalized to a point of almost complete insignificance.
The reader encounters the consequences of Weddington's view
about the insignificance of McCorvey as an individual client throughout both books. McCorvey claims, for example, that Weddington
never consulted with or informed her about the decision to file a class
action in Roe, a decision which made McCorvey a class representative
and created the potential for a divergence between McCorvey's individual interests and the collective interests of the class. 90 Another issue McCorvey's book raises is Weddington's candor with McCorvey
about the chances of her actually obtaining an abortion. Since she was
already several months pregnant and the case was bound to raise hotly
contested issues likely to be resolved only after a lengthy appeal process, the chances of McCorvey herself actually obtaining an abortion
were slim at best. McCorvey tells of holding on while the case was
pending before the trial court to an unrealistically high expectation
that she would be able to abort her pregnancy, apparently ignorant of
the fact that abortions could not be easily obtained after a certain
point in a pregnancy. McCorvey describes elation when she is told
about the trial court victory in Roe, then being crushed upon learning
that her pregnancy was too far advanced for her to obtain an
abortion. 9 1
Reading Weddington's book, one looks in vain for a passage in
which she describes clearly informing and counseling McCorvey about
these issues. When Weddington describes what she told McCorvey at
the outset of their relationship, for example, she never mentions informing McCorvey about the class action, the conflict of interest issues raised, or what the chances were for the case to actually help her
obtain an abortion. 92 Weddington's failure to treat these issues in detail is itself telling of her view of the significance of the individual
client. Though crucial to the individual client, these issues simply do
not seem worthy of treatment by Weddington. Or perhaps Wedding89.
(1982).

Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183

90.

MCCORVEY, supra note 6, at 137.

91.

Id. at 127.

92.

WEDDINGTON,

supra note 7, at 51-53.
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ton's failure to meet McCorvey's needs at the time Roe was being
litigated prompts her to submerge McCorvey's needs now, to avoid
tainting or diminishing the significance of her victory.
In McCorvey's book, the abandonment of the premise that clients
define litigation objectives found in Weddington's book is taken a step
further. Not only does the lawyer shape the litigation, she shapes the
client as well. Rather than one who defines the litigation's goals
through her interests and choices, the client appears as an object
transformed in accordance with the lawyer's vision of how she ought
to be. Weddington's major themes of a collective effort to transform
abortion law and the conflict between the abortion rights cause and
the anti-abortion movement appear in McCorvey's book.93 But they
function more as a backdrop for what is essentially a personal story
about how an individual fares in a conflict between powerful collective interests. Her story is essentially one of the abortion rights cause
using, ignoring, and then transforming an individual to reflect its values. Its drama arises from the tension between McCorvey and the
women's movement and the reconciliation of that tension through her
transformation.
Both books describe the Roe litigation as being consistent with
the overall pattern of each woman's life. Weddington for much of her
life has identified deeply with the abortion rights cause, has acted as a
representative of the collective interests of women, and has
subordinated her individual self-interest to the collective interests
symbolized by the abortion rights cause. These same values and attitudes carried over to her involvement in the Roe case. The interests
of the cause are given primary value, she views herself as representing
the collective interests of women rather than McCorvey's interests,
and the individual interests of McCorvey are subordinated to the collective interests of women.
Similarly, McCorvey's story of Roe is consistent with the pattern
of her life. A primary theme in McCorvey's self-portrait is being powerless, voiceless, someone whose life is shaped by others with power
and authority to act and speak. McCorvey appears as the victim of
many of these people-such as her mother and her husband. Her depiction of her lawyers fits with this pattern in much of her narrative,
especially those portions dealing with the time period in which the
Roe case was being litigated. Here Weddington and Linda Coffee are

93.

See, e.g., McCoRvEY, supra note 6, chs. 2, 4, 6, 8, 16, 18.
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viewed simply as more people in McCorvey's life who use her for their
own ends.
What is surprising is that McCorvey in her book ultimately describes the process of being reshaped through the Roe case as an experience of empowerment and liberation, rather than one of
disempowerment and subjugation. She states at the end of her book,
for example, "without Jane Roe, without a cause to fight for and a
purpose for living, the original Norma would never have survived." 94
However, McCorvey's realignment on the abortion issue and her baptism by the national director of Operation Rescue, the militant antiabortion group, roughly a year after publishing her book, make the
transformatory experience she describes in that book look more like
another example of her tendency to allow others to dominate her.
III
What is there to learn about public interest lawyers from Weddington's and McCorvey's books? Here we need to be wary of the
temptation to generalize from memorable, but possibly idiosyncratic,
data. 95 These books describe a single case which in many ways was far
from routine and may or may not be representative of public interest
practice in general. 96 Though many of the issues addressed in Section
II resonate with concerns often raised in the academic literature on
public interest lawyers, the intensely emotional and controversial nature of the abortion question as well as the publicity the Roe case
received may have generated pressures on the attorney-client relationship that were different in degree if not in kind from those encountered in more routine public interest cases. 97 With this
reservation in mind, I want to review some of the things I think we can
learn from these books.
94. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 199.
95. See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 17-24
(3d ed. 1994); RICHARD NISBE-r-r & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 17-62 (1980).
96. See Southworth, supra note 3 (empirical research in civil rights and poverty practice revealed norms on issues of lawyer deference and domination in interaction with clients that were varied, nuanced, and differed by practice setting).
97.

Compare David Treadwell, Abortion Plaintiffs Now on Opposite Sides: Similar

Pasts, Different Viewpoints for Roe, Doe, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1989, at 1 (describing relationship between Sandra Cano, the individual plaintiff in Roe's companion case, Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and her attorneys. Cano came from a troubled background
similar in many ways to McCorvey's. She now claims to have never wanted an abortion.
Her attorneys contest this assertion. Like McCorvey, Cano has been involved with Operation Rescue.)
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A. Mimicking the Opposition
A recurring issue in public interest litigation is the tension between representing individual interests and collective interests. An
argument in favor of individual client focus is that when public interest lawyers place collective interests over the interests of an individual
client, they mimic the very failings of governmental institutions that
98
public interest litigation typically seeks to remedy.
Driven by a political process intended to be responsive to the aggregate demands of groups, legislatures and administrative agencies
by nature tend to focus on collective interests. Courts, by contrast, are
designed to focus on the interests of individuals, and lawyers are the
key to gaining access to this institution. When public interest litigators
put collective interests before the interests of individual clients, their
clients get lost in the collective shuffle, just as they do before legislatures and administrative agencies. Public interest lawyers operating
without a focus on individual client interests are "indistinguishable
from a good governmental bureaucracy." 99
Weddington's and McCorvey's accounts of Roe support this criticism. The treatment of McCorvey described in these books resembles
the way government bureaucracy treats an individual. Bureaucracy is
anonymous, depersonalized, and distant. 100 Weddington uses the
pseudonym "Jane Roe" to refer to McCorvey throughout her book,
rather than using McCorvey's real name, despite the fact that McCorvey had decided years before to reveal her identity to journalists and
voluntarily become a public figure in the abortion rights debate. McCorvey spends pages in her book describing the immediate personal
impact on her life of the Roe case's failure to obtain an abortion for
her. She was "furious" with Weddington and Coffee. 10 She experienced the emotional upheaval of having, and then giving up for adoption, an unwanted child. Then she attempted suicide.'0 2 In
Weddington's book, the Roe case's failure to satisfy McCorvey's need
for an abortion is reduced to one concise, detached sentence: "it was
too late for Jane Roe; she gave birth early in the summer and placed
the baby up for adoption .... ,o 3 In a chapter titled "Victory," Wed98. See Hegland, supra note 3, at 812-13.
99. Id. ("Without clients, what are we doing? Without clients, we are setting up a law
office that is indistinguishable from a good governmental bureaucracy.").
100. KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 6-22 (1984).
101.

McCoRvEY, supra note 6, at 127.

102. Id. at 127-35.
103. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 69.
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dington recounts the Supreme Court's announcement of the Roe decision and how she personally shared the dramatic news with fellow
supporters of the cause. McCorvey, though, learned of the landmark
decision rendered in her name "just like everyone else," by reading
about it in a newspaper. 1°4
Bureaucracies have been described as obscuring the human
agency in the exercise of power by various means, insulating it from
scrutiny and challenge. 10 5 Justifications based on efficiency, for example, may be used "as a guise to conceal the control function" of bureaucratic hierarchy. 10 6 Parts of Weddington's justification for
rejecting McCorvey's rape claim serve such a masking function. Irrelevance and lack of proof, for example, are suggested by Weddington
as justifications as if they dictated rejection of the rape claim, leaving
the lawyers no power or choice. Upon examination, though, these justifications fail to explain rejection of the rape claim. Rather, they obscure the exercise of strategic power by the lawyers behind a mask of
apparent legal inevitability.
Weddington's treatment of McCorvey also ironically mimics in
several respects the precise failings she attributes to her opposition in
her often articulate and effective critique of restrictive abortion laws.
Her dominant point, as the title of her book suggests, is that women
should have choice-the power to decide questions that seriously affect their lives. Restrictive abortion laws fail to accept women as individuals capable of choice and render them powerless over such
questions. Weddington, though, in her book allows McCorvey virtually no choice or power concerning the Roe case, a matter that seriously and immediately affected McCorvey's life and reproductive
choices. Weddington also criticizes restrictive abortion laws as treating a woman as merely a means to an end, a reproductive vehicle or
"carrying case for a fetus. 1 0° 7 Yet Weddington treated McCorvey almost exclusively as a means to serve the end of changing the law of
abortion. Weddington describes McCorvey as "ancillary" to the pri-

104. MCCORVEY, supra note 6, at 140, 150; WEDDINGTON, supranote 7, at 148 ("1 tried
but was unable to reach Jane Roe. I finally gave up, thinking that since she remained
anonymous she would not get caught off-guard by press calls; I assumed she had heard or
would see press reports ....
").
105. FERGUSON,supra note 100, at 10-11; White, supra note 3, at 35.
106. FERGUSON, supra note 100, at 11.
107. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 249.
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mary focus on all women.'08 The word ancillary, derived from the
Latin word "ancilla" for a maid-servant, conveys the idea of a
subordinate, instrumental role. 10 9 Weddington also describes McCorvey and the other individual plaintiffs in the case as "vehicles for
presenting larger issues.""10 McCorvey, from her vantage, writes of
the lawyers as "[u]sing me as their plaintiff.""' The picture she paints
is clearly one of being simply the lawyers' "ticket" 1 2 to the
courtroom.
Weddington urges government institutions such as the Supreme
Court and state legislatures to listen to women's voices, yet Weddington in her account of the case rarely pays heed to McCorvey's voice.
In Weddington's portrayal of their initial encounter, the details of McCorvey's rape story, for example, are not worth listening to. Weddington faults restrictive abortion laws and their supporters for treating
the woman as "invisible." 113 She writes that "they seldom mention
the woman. They seem to look through her, to ignore her.""14 In
Weddington's own tale of Roe, though, McCorvey is seldom mentioned and is largely invisible. In reference to the television movie
about the case, Weddington tells us that "Jane Roe's" involvement in
Roe "was so minimal that it was hard [for the screenwriters] to tie
together Jane Roe's situation and the work on the case.""15 Elsewhere Weddington states that though "often the plaintiff is a vital part
of the case ... that was not the situation with Roe.""16 McCorvey
picks up her lawyers' attitude, writing that she was "nothing to Sarah
and Linda, nothing more than just a name on a piece of paper.""17

108. l at 61 ("From the beginning we considered the individuals who would be involved in the cases as ancillaryto the primary focus on all women who, if pregnant, would
want to have access to all options, including legal abortion.") (first emphasis added).
109. Tim OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 447-48 (2d ed. 1989).
110. WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 61 ("Ours were not cases about only Jane Roe or
John and Mary Doe, although they were the vehicles for presenting the larger issues.")
(emphasis added).
111. McCoRvEY, supra note 6, at 137.
112. See Hegland, supra note 3, at 811-12 ("A more accurate view of public interest
clients is that they are "tickets"-without which the firm could not play the law game.").
113. WEDDINOTON, supra note 7, at 249.
114. Id at 253.
115. Id. at 259.
116. Id. at 260.
117. McCoRvEY,supra note 6, at 127.
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The Danger of Idealism: Protecting the Case from the Client

A recurring problem in the regulation of lawyers is how to deal
with incentives that tempt a lawyer to behave improperly. 118 Concern
with this problem is common in any agency relationship.' 19 Legal and
ethical rules governing lawyers often focus on risks to a client from
economic incentives that may affect her lawyer, while ignoring risks
from noneconomic incentives such as the lawyer's ideals. The United
States Supreme Court, for example, in holding that lawyer solicitation
on behalf of a legal advocacy group is constitutionally immune from
state solicitation rules, made the following assessment of nonmonetary
incentives:
There has been no showing of a serious danger here of professionally reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against solicita-

tion frequently seek to prevent. This is so partly because no

monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger that the
interests of his client
attorney will desert or subvert the paramount
120
to enrich himself or an outside sponsor.

According to this view, a lawyer's financial self-interest is dangerous
to clients, but a lawyer's ideals are not.
Similarly, the Model Rules, reflecting the pecuniary-nonpecuniary distinction found in the Supreme Court's solicitation cases, prohibit a lawyer from soliciting a potential client in person
"when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.'' l12 Here, again, financial motives are viewed as dangerous, rendering such solicitation "fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching.' 22 Nonpecuniary
motives such as idealism, by contrast, are seen as benign. Accordingly, public interest lawyers driven by ideals rather than dollars are
exempted by the Model Rules from the personal solicitation prohibition on the ground that "[t]here is far less likelihood that a lawyer
would engage in abusive practices against an individual.., where the
118.

See Kevin McMunigal, RethinkingAttorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine,5 GEO. J.

LEGAL ETHICS

823, 829-33 (1992).

119. Economists use the term "agency cost" in dealing with the concern that incentives
may lead an agent not to act in the best interests of the principal. See, e.g., Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
120. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,442-43 (1963) (emphasis added). This same view
is implicit in the Supreme Court's more recent constitutional cases in the area of solicitation. The Court continues to employ the pecuniary-nonpecuniary distinction as the dividing line between constitutionally protected and unprotected solicitation. See In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
121.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

122.

Id. Rule 7.3 cmt. 1.

Rule 7.3(a) (1983).

March1996]

TWO TALES OF ROE v. WADE

lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain."'123
Weddington's and McCorvey's stories prompt us to examine
closely the assumptions that underlie this view. They provide a powerful illustration of how a lawyer's ideals may be a potent threat to a
client's interests and support Derrick Bell's observation that
"[i]dealism, though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control."'124
Weddington, throughout both books, is portrayed as admirably immune from the sort of "pecuniary gain" motives normally viewed as
threatening to client interests. Ironically, though, the attitude that appears to make Weddington herself immune to greed-that the good of
the cause trumps individual self-interest-seems to be the very thing
that leads her to ignore McCorvey's interests.
The attitude Weddington adopts throughout her book is that the
collective interests of women and the principles of the abortion rights
movement are of paramount importance and prevail over individual
self-interest. When Weddington applies this attitude to herself, the
resulting self-sacrifice seems admirable. Her view is also aligned with
one of the ideals of the legal profession, the lawyer as legal reformer
committed to advancement of collective public interest. Because of
superior knowledge and expertise, lawyers are thought to have a special responsibility to advance the community's welfare by giving of
their own time and effort to fuel the process of legal reform. 25 With
Weddington, the community is more narrowly defined, but the preference for collective interest over self-interest is similar.
123. ld. Rule 7.3 cmt. 4 (emphasis added).
124. Bell, supra note 3, at 504.
125. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1981)
("Changes in human affairs and imperfections in human institutions make necessary constant efforts to maintain and improve our legal system .... By reason of education and
experience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system
and to initiate corrective measures therein. Thus they should participate in proposing and
supporting legislation and programs to improve the system, without regard to the general
interests or desires of clients or former clients.") (footnotes omitted); Lon L. Fuller & John
D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1217 (1958) ("There are few great figures in the history of the Bar who have not concerned
themselves with the reform and improvement of the law. The special obligation of the
profession with respect to legal reform rests on considerations too obvious to require
enumeration. Certainly, it is the lawyer who has both the best chance to know when the,
law is working badly and the special competence to put it in order.... The lawyer concerned for the standing of his profession will, therefore, interest himself actively in the
improvement of the law. In doing so he will not only help to maintain confidence in the
Bar, but will have the satisfaction of meeting a responsibility inhering in the nature of his
calling.").
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Weddington seems unable or unwilling to distinguish between applying this attitude to her own self-interest and applying it to the selfinterest of her client, McCorvey. A lawyer preferring collective interests over the interests of her client is contrary to the notion of client
autonomy upon which current legal ethics rules are grounded. Under
these rules, McCorvey, not Weddington, should be the one who decides whether to sacrifice McCorvey's interests in favor of the abortion rights cause. A person's lawyer, after all, is the one a client relies
upon to protect her interests.
Weddington's disregard for McCorvey, then, seems more than
just an oversight. It seems naturally to flow from Weddington's stance
that the good of the cause trumps individual self-interest. This stance
results not just in ignoring McCorvey's interests, but also in viewing
her interests as a potential threat to the case. Rather than shaping the
case to reflect client interests, Weddington seems guided by an imperative to protect it from the client's interests.
This attitude of protecting the case from the client is reflected in
Weddington's approach to McCorvey. At times it is implicit, such as
in the passage early in the book in which Weddington describes her
justification for rejecting McCorvey's rape allegation. In other
passages it is explicit. For example, toward the end of her book, when
Weddington writes about her ultimate discovery that McCorvey's rape
allegation was, in fact, a lie, Weddington states: "I thanked my lucky
stars that Linda and I had excluded any mention of how she got pregnant. Neither her lie nor her admission could hurt the case from a
legal point of view. ' 126 At another point, Weddington states that McCorvey's conduct and her "inconsistencies may hurt the public perception of the case, but they cannot hurt the case as a legal document, or
' 127
the principles it represents.
C. Should Lawyer Ethics Rules Be Modified in Reform Litigation?

The client autonomy and conflict of interest norms of the lawyer
professional codes, as mentioned previously, are client-centered. The
client has the right, after being fully informed by the lawyer, to set the
goals of the representation 128 and to have her lawyer carry out those
126.
127.
128.

WEDDINGTON, supra note 7, at 257 (emphasis added).

Id. at 260 (emphasis added).

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ECs 5-1, 7-7 (1981).

Rule 1.2(a) (1983);

MODEL CODE OF
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goals unaffected by the interests of anyone other than the client. 129
Weddington's representation of McCorvey, as portrayed in both Weddington's and McCorvey's books, clearly deviates from these norms.
Weddington fails to fully inform McCorvey, allows her virtually no
role in setting the goals pursued in Roe v. Wade, and disregards McCorvey's interests in favor of the collective interests of the abortion
rights cause.
Weddington also deviates from the vision of appropriate lawyer
behavior advanced by the new poverty law scholars. 130 These scholars
criticize lawyers, even well-intentioned ones, for failure to listen to
and respect client voices. Weddington repeatedly fails to heed McCorvey's voice and marginalizes her to a point of almost complete
insignificance. Indeed, Weddington appears at points in both her
book and McCorvey's book as almost a caricature of the sort of lawyer domination the new poverty law scholars see as menacing legal
representation of the poor.
Weddington was knowledgeable about legal ethics norms, referring to them at several points in her book. Her first job after law
school was assisting a professor in his work with the American Bar
Association's Special Committee on the Reevaluation of Ethical Standards, which was drafting the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.' 3 ' Weddington tells us in her book that she patterns her
professional relationships with others on the example set by the chair
of that ABA committee, who once offered her a job as his special
assistant at the ABA. 32 What then explains her marked departure
from legal ethics norms as fundamental as those concerning client autonomy and conflict of interest?
Both Weddington's and McCorvey's books provide insights that
help answer this question. One factor that appears influential in shaping Weddington's attitude and conduct toward McCorvey is the degree of Weddington's identification with and commitment to the
collective interests of women and, in particular, the abortion rights
cause. The depth of this identification and commitment, rooted in her
own experience of an illegal abortion and reflected in her life-long
commitment to the abortion rights cause, is evidenced throughout her
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1981).

Rule 1.7 (1983);

MODEL CODE

130. The work of these scholars is described in William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of
ProgressiveLawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarshipin the Post-Modern,PostReagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1099, 1099-1108 (1994).

131.

WEDDINOTON,

132.

Id. at 262.

supra note 7, at 23.
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book and is captured in her description of her victory on behalf of the
abortion rights cause in Roe as "an integral part of my values and my
33
self-concept."1
Another influence that may have contributed to Weddington's
disregard of conventional client-centered norms is the sort of client
McCorvey was. McCorvey describes herself as a "street person"'134 at
the time she met Weddington. Plagued by alcohol and drugs, she was
often unable to hold a job, to feed, clothe, or house herself. McCorvey's lack of sophistication and information are suggested by her
claim to have first learned what an abortion was just shortly before
her first meeting with Weddington. 135 When she met Weddington, she
was, at age twenty-one, experiencing her third unplanned pregnancy.
She admittedly lied and tried to manipulate Weddington with her false
rape story.
In short, McCorvey appeared a far cry from the sort of dignified,
insightful, and able client the new poverty law scholars assume lawyers encounter in poverty practice. 136 By her own description, McCorvey must have seemed to Weddington barely able to make choices
about her own life, much less competent to make decisions that might
affect the future reproductive choices of millions of other women.
Nor did McCorvey have the ability to effectively question or challenge
Weddington's representation of her interests.
Together these factors seem to have rendered Weddington oblivious to her ethical obligations to McCorvey. One area of insensitivity
has already been examined: Weddington's attitude that the collective
good of the abortion rights cause trumps individual self-interest and
her failure to distinguish between applying that preference for collective good to herself and applying it to her client. A similar blind spot
is found in Weddington's failure to distinguish between her work on
the Roe case and other sorts of law reform activity she undertooksuch as lobbying, leading reform organizations, working on campaigns, and running for political office-that entail commitment to
collective constituencies but not to one particular client. As previously mentioned, professional ethics codes encourage lawyers to en133.
134.

WEDDINOTON, supra note 7, at 198-99.

MCCORVEY, supra note 6, at 117.
135. MCCORVEY, supra note 6, at 104-06.
136. Simon, supra note 130, at 1101 ("The new poverty law scholarship proceeds from
two central premises, one about clients and one about representation. The client premise
insists on the dignity, insight, and abilities of poor people.").
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gage in the process of law reform. 137 When engaged in such
nonlitigation law reform work, lawyers are not constrained by the in138
terests of particular clients.
Weddington is an admirable example of a lawyer pursuing this
law reform paradigm with its collective commitment and rejection of
individual client interest. The problem arises when Weddington extends the law reform paradigm to reform litigation in which she represents an individual client. For Weddington, law reform in all its facets,
including reform litigation, is driven by commitment to collective interest. She recognizes no separation between law reform on behalf of
collective constituencies and the representation of an individual client
in litigation. This submerging of private representation into the collective enterprise of law reform may be at least partially a product of
the fact that Weddington's legal career, at least as described in her
book, was almost entirely devoted to work driven by collective concerns, either law reform work or government service. Weddington describes in her career virtually no significant legal work other than Roe
v. Wade representing individual clients.
Weddington seems to have adopted, without acknowledgment or
perhaps even awareness, a model of the attorney-client relationship
similar to one espoused by Stephen Wexler in his 1971 law review
article, Practicing Law for Poor People.139 In that article, Wexler
"flaunted a tough-minded disdain, not only for individual claim assertion, but also for the purely individual concerns of particular clients.
140
Instead, he advocated efforts to assist the poor to collective power.'
Weddington shows a similar "tough-minded disdain" for McCorvey's
individual claims and concerns in order to assist women to collective
power. But unlike Wexler, her adoption of this model is implicit
rather than explicit.
What, if anything, do these books suggest about how lawyer ethics rules should deal with law reform litigators such as Weddington?
Keeping in mind the caution not to overgeneralize from one vivid but
137. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 8-9 ("The advancement of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making,
needed changes and improvements.").
138. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 ("[Lawyers] should participate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs to improve the system, without regardto the generalinterests or desires of clients orformer clients.") (emphasis added).
139. Wexler, supra note 3.
140. Simon, supra note 130, at 1099.
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perhaps unrepresentative case, I want to briefly discuss two possible
views on this question in light of Weddington's and McCorvey's tales.
The first is the conventional view that the norms regarding client
autonomy and conflict of interest do not and should not make any
exception for lawyers, such as Weddington, pursuing law reform litigation. According to this view, law reform litigators are and should be
held to the same client-centered autonomy and conflict of interest
standards applied to all lawyers representing clients. This view dictates that a lawyer who wants to change the law through reform litigation has to search to find a client whose goals and interests are aligned
with those of the cause the lawyer wishes to advance. Under this
view, once Weddington accepted McCorvey as her client, her primary
commitment should have been to serving and protecting McCorvey's
interests. If Weddington wanted to reform the law, she should have
looked longer and harder for a client whose primary goal was to reform the law of abortion and whose interests did not conflict with that
goal.
Weddington did in fact search for such a client. Although it was
not difficult to find women who wanted to change the law of abortion,
Weddington needed to find one who was pregnant and wanted to
abort her pregnancy for her to have standing to challenge the Texas
abortion statute. Weddington relates that this search "turned out to
be a bigger problem than we anticipated."'1

4t

Because of the time con-

straints on abortions, any woman with standing to challenge the abortion statute would have been subject to the same tension as McCorvey
between the goal of aborting her own pregnancy and the goal of reforming the law to benefit women in the future. Weddington describes considering and rejecting as potential plaintiffs for this very
reason several women who came to the abortion referral project prior
to her meeting McCorvey.142
A second view on the legal ethics of law reform litigation would
be to allow the lawyer and the potential client at the outset of the
representation openly to negotiate the allocation of power between
them to permit the lawyer to exercise power in setting the goals of the
representation. Under this view, the lawyer and client would be free
to deviate from the conventional norm prescribed in the lawyer ethics
codes, which grants the client exclusive power to set those goals, provided the client was fully informed and consented.
141.
142.

WEDDINGTON,

Id.

supra note 7, at 51.
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How law reform litigators should interact with clients has been
the subject of debate. 143 I do not intend here to address all the issues
raised in that debate about the appropriate division of power between
attorney and client in law reform litigation. Rather, in keeping with
the focus of this essay, I want to discuss what Weddington's and McCorvey's stories suggest as some of the advantages and disadvantages
of this second view compared with the conventional view.
First, their stories suggest that the conventional norms will be ignored when the lawyer's allegiance to the cause of reform is strong
enough, the reform potential of the case is great enough, and the client does not or cannot effectively monitor the lawyer's behavior.
These books show that the forces driving lawyers to use their own
values in controlling reform litigation may at times simply be too great
and the checks restraining them too weak for even bright, well-informed and well-intentioned lawyers to adhere to the conventional
norms. Their stories make these norms, in the context of a case such
as Roe v. Wade, seem naive in their insistence that McCorvey's goals
and interests alone should govern the handling of a case the lawyers
view as implicating the reproductive rights of women throughout the
country. These norms view lawyers' nonmonetary incentives, such as
their ideals and values, as posing no threat to clients. They also assume that lawyers can and will simply ignore their own values, the
very values that may have motivated them to invest their time and
effort in the case, if they diverge from the client's goals. Weddington's
and McCorvey's tales make these attitudes seem quite unrealistic
about the risks posed by nonmonetary incentives and the willingness
and ability of reform lawyers to resist the pressures these incentives
may generate in reform litigation.
The conventional client-centered norms applied to reform litigation also create pressures for law reform litigators not to be candid
with clients and, consciously or unconsciously, to adopt stratagems to
hide their exercise of power, such as Weddington's masking her rejection of McCorvey's rape allegation with rationales of irrelevance and
lack of proof. Allowing the lawyer openly to negotiate with the client
over the allocation of power in their relationship encourages the lawyer to be candid and directly address the issue of power and goals in
the representation. If this issue is openly addressed, the client may in
fact end up better informed and protected since she may be less likely
143. See, ag., LUBAN, supra note 3; TUSHNET, supra note 3; Bell, supra note 3; Ellman,
supra note 3.
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to be misled into relying on the lawyer for protection of her individual
interests, protection which the lawyer may not provide.
Some of the most disturbing passages in McCorvey's book are
those in which she describes her reliance on Weddington to obtain an
abortion for her and her bitterness and anger upon realizing her own
needs would not be met by the Roe case. If Weddington had been
more candid with McCorvey at the outset, McCorvey might still have
agreed to be the plaintiff in the case. But her expectations would
hopefully have been more realistic and her reliance on Weddington
lessened. She might have continued, for example, her own efforts to
gain an abortion through means other than Weddington and the Roe
case, such as seeking out the guidance of an abortion referral service
like the one Weddington worked with in Austin. She also might have
been better prepared psychologically for the disappointment of not
obtaining an abortion and felt less angry with and used by her lawyer.
In sum, this second view might provide clearer notice to clients
about how much power they will exercise and how their interests will
be treated in reform litigation. Clearer notice in turn might reduce
some of the problems resulting from reliance by the client on the lawyer to look out for her interests since the lawyer would explicitly tell
the client that her interests will not be the primary goal of the
litigation.
The preceding argument is based on recognition of the human
limitations of reform litigators. It takes the position that our ethics
rules should acknowledge that reform litigators in certain cases will be
unable or unwilling to resist, consciously or unconsciously, using their
own values to override client values in reform litigation. The following argument, by contrast, views permitting reallocation of power to
reform litigators as not just a necessary recognition of human weakness, but as a positive good on the basis of the social benefits it would
produce.
Litigation has both private and public dimensions. The private
dimensions include resolving a particular dispute, remedying a past
wrong to a particular individual, or exonerating a particular person of
wrongdoing. The public dimensions include the generation of precedent, development of the law, and the application of public values in
resolving disputes.1 44 The balance between the private and public

dimensions in any particular case varies, with the private aspects dom144. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 262226 (1995); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REv. 668, 676-77 (1986).
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inating in many, perhaps most cases. But in some cases, such as the
landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the public dimensions loom large.
The client-centered norms found in current legal ethics doctrine,
like the notion of party control in civil procedure, fail to account for
the public dimensions of litigation, particularly in cases implicating
important public concerns. Allowing the allocation of more power to
lawyers with commitments to collective constituencies with interests
broader than those of the individual client may help remedy this
problem.
A person choosing whether or not to become the plaintiff in reform litigation might be analogized to a person choosing to become
the subject of biomedical research. Both reform litigation and biomedical research may produce benefits to the larger society but may
fail to help the individual client or patient. Routine medical practice
is "designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual."' 145
Medical research, by contrast, is aimed at producing broader social
146
benefit, "to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge."'
Ethical norms in medicine allow patients to participate in medical research, the goals of which are determined by doctors not patients, if
the patient has knowingly and freely consented. 147
Routine litigation may be viewed as analogous to routine medical
practice, in which advancing the interests of the client is the primary
objective. Perhaps reform litigation, because of its potential to produce social benefits such as development and reform of the law,
should be treated in a fashion analogous to medical research. A client
such as McCorvey would be informed about the lawyers' goals for the
litigation and that the litigation would not be aimed primarily at advancing her own personal goals. She could then choose whether or
not to let herself be used primarily as a vehicle for helping women as a
group, with the possibility of some secondary benefit to herself.
Under this approach, Weddington's collective preference in pursuing
the Roe case would be defensible if she had made adequate disclosure
to McCorvey and allowed her to choose whether or not to be involved
on those terms.
Although Weddington's and McCorvey's books suggest some advantages to allowing lawyers and clients to negotiate an allocation of
145. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 3 (1979).
146.
147.
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power different from that presently found in the lawyer ethics codes,
they also suggest several problems. One is unequal bargaining power.
How capable, for example, would a potential client such as McCorvey
have been to negotiate with a lawyer such as Weddington? Uneducated, unsophisticated, beset with financial, drug, and alcohol
problems, McCorvey's desperation to abort her pregnancy put her in a
particularly vulnerable position. The choice facing such a potential
client may well be between representation by the law reform litigator
on whatever terms she may offer or no representation at all, giving the
lawyer great leverage. These books also raise questions about the
quality and completeness of the disclosure one can expect from a lawyer who needs the client as her ticket to the courtroom. The conventional view reflected in our current ethics rules seeks to preempt such
bargaining power and disclosure problems by giving exclusive goalsetting authority to the client.
Which of these two views one deems preferable may ultimately
depend on one's assumptions about lawyer compliance with legal ethics norms and how one frames the choice. If one assumes compliance
with the conventional view and frames the choice as one between a
lawyer who defers to client goals and interests or a lawyer who puts
the client second to the lawyer's commitment to changing the law, one
may well prefer the conventional view reflected in our current ethics
rules. McCorvey's and Weddington's tales suggest that a different
compliance assumption and a different way of framing the relevant
choice are more realistic, at least in certain cases. If one assumes that
lawyers under certain circumstances will not be able or willing to adhere to a client-centered approach and frames the choice as between a
lawyer who clandestinely deviates from client-centered norms or a
lawyer who openly acknowledges her exercise of power in setting litigation goals and candidly reveals her priorities, the second view may
well be preferable since clients such as McCorvey would at least know
what sort of representation they are getting and adjust their expectations and conduct accordingly.
Conclusion
There is much to admire in Sarah Weddington's work on Roe v.
Wade as portrayed in the two books which are the focus of this essay.
She appears as a bright, hardworking, self-sacrificing lawyer, dedicated to using her considerable energy and skill to advance her vision
of the collective interests of women. A twenty-seven-year-old lawyer
taking her first contested case to the United States Supreme Court
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and winning a landmark decision undoing a century's worth of legislation is, in and of itself, a remarkable professional feat. Given the high
visibility of Roe and the significance of Weddington's role, many lawyers and law students will naturally and appropriately view Weddington as both heroine and role model. Consequently, careful
examination of her assumptions and attitudes about public interest
lawyering and reform litigation is appropriate.
McCorvey's and Weddington's stories provide the opportunity
for such an examination. In both, an able and well-intentioned lawyer
with ambitious law reform goals deviates from conventional professional norms of client autonomy and conflict of interest without explicit acknowledgment and perhaps without awareness of that
deviation. These books provide a concrete sense of the impact lawyer
domination may have on the client who provides the opportunity to
advance the lawyer's law reform goals. On one level, Weddington
might have moderated this impact by simply treating McCorvey with
greater respect and understanding. On another level, though, these
books help us appreciate the seemingly inevitable tension between
collective and individual interest in reform litigation, and the strength
of the forces impelling Weddington to prefer the collective interests of
women over those of McCorvey. Finally, these two tales of Roe v.
Wade suggest that conventional norms of legal ethics doctrine currently underestimate and inadequately respond to these forces in reform litigation.

